PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.
Defendant Rico Rodrigus Williams, a former member of the United States Air Force, killed Army Sergeant Juwan Johnson during a Gangster Disciples gang initiation that took place on July 3, 2005, near the Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. In Count One of the Indictment in this case, the government charged Mr. Williams with second degree murder in connection with Sergeant Johnson's death, asserting jurisdiction under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act ("MEJA"). 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq.
As the Court instructed the jury, in order for Mr. Williams to be found guilty of second degree murder under MEJA, the government was required to prove at trial five elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
Nov. 9, 2010 Trial Tr. at 38. On November 15, 2010, the jury concluded that the government satisfied its burden on Count One, finding Mr. Williams guilty of second degree murder.
This matter is before the Court on Mr. Williams' motion for judgment of acquittal on Count One. The motion raises two grounds for acquittal: as Mr. Williams describes it, the government failed to prove at trial (1) that Mr. Williams killed Sergeant Johnson with malice aforethought; and (2) that Mr. Williams "resided with a member of the Armed Forces outside the United States on the date of [Sergeant] Johnson's death[.]" Mot. at 2.
The Court heard oral argument on Mr. Williams' motion on June 1, 2011. The Court then resolved the first part of the motion by oral opinion on June 3, 2011, concluding that "with respect to the mens rea element, the motion ... should be denied." June 3, 2011 Tr. at 47; see id. at 28-46. In that oral opinion, however, the Court stated that it was not ruling on Mr.
On February 3, 2009, a grand jury returned an Indictment charging defendant Rico Rodrigus Williams with one count of second degree murder and three counts of witness tampering. Before trial, the government dismissed one of the witness tampering counts.
As charged in Count One of the Indictment, on or about July 3, 2005, Mr. Williams unlawfully killed Sergeant Juwan Johnson during a Gangster Disciples gang initiation in Germany by striking Sergeant Johnson with his fists and kicking him with his feet. See Indictment ¶ 5. As charged in Counts Two and Three, Mr. Williams then intimidated and threatened, or attempted to intimidate and threaten, other members of his gang with the intent to prevent them from communicating information about the events surrounding Sergeant Johnson's death to United States law enforcement authorities. See id. ¶¶ 7, 9.
As for Count One, the Indictment specifically charged the following:
Indictment ¶¶ 3-5 (emphasis in original).
Trial in this case began on October 25, 2010. After the government completed its case-in-chief, Mr. Williams orally moved for judgment of acquittal on all three counts in the Indictment. See Nov. 2, 2010 Trial Tr. at 5-11, 23, 25-29.
On November 15, 2010, Mr. Williams was found guilty on Count One, second degree murder; and Count Two, witness tampering. See Verdict Form at 1-2. Mr. Williams was acquitted on Count Three, the other witness tampering count. See id. at 2. After the jury rendered its verdict, Mr. Williams requested the opportunity for post-trial briefing, see Minute Entry, Nov. 15, 2010, and he then filed three post-trial motions, see Dkt. Nos. 139, 140, 141, including his pending motion for judgment of acquittal on Count One.
The Court heard argument on those motions on June 1, 2011 and issued an oral opinion on June 3, 2011. See generally June 3, 2011 Tr. That oral opinion resolved all of the issues presented in Mr. Williams' three post-trial motions, see generally id., except one: Mr. Williams' claim that "the government failed to offer sufficient evidence that [he] resided with a member of the Armed Forces outside the United States on the date of [Sergeant] Johnson's death[.]" Mot. at 2; see also June 3, 2011 Tr. at 55-56.
The Court ordered supplemental briefing on the "residing with" element. As the Court explained:
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1, June 6, 2011 [Dkt. No. 149]. The Court therefore directed the parties to file supplemental briefs discussing any authority that may assist the Court in its consideration
Under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court must enter a judgment of acquittal on any offense charged for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. United States v. Safavian, 644 F.Supp.2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C.2009). In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must "`consider[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determin[e] whether, so read, it is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Kayode, 254 F.3d 204, 212 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1464 (D.C.Cir.1997)). The Court must "accord[] the government the benefit of all legitimate inferences," United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 437 (D.C.Cir.1983), and accept the jury's verdict of guilt if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 48 (D.C.Cir.2002) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). Put another way, the Court may grant a motion for judgment of acquittal only where "a reasonable juror must necessarily have had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant['s] guilt." United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d at 437 (emphasis in original).
Mr. Williams was convicted of second degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), under MEJA. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq. See Indictment ¶¶ 2-5; Verdict Form at 1-2. "Congress enacted MEJA in response to a jurisdictional gap created by host nations' reluctance to prosecute crimes against Americans committed by civilians accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States." United States v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir.2007). "To close this gap, MEJA creates federal jurisdiction over those who commit felonies while `accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a)(1)). Under MEJA,
United States v. Arnt, 474 F.3d at 1161.
In Count One, Mr. Williams was charged with second degree murder in the killing of Sergeant Johnson — the underlying felony offense — committed while he was accompanying a member of the United States Armed Forces in Germany. Because the government asserted jurisdiction under MEJA, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both the standard elements of second degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), and MEJA's jurisdictional elements. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2). Thus, among other things, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams was "residing with" a member of the United States Armed Forces outside of the United States at the time he killed Sergeant Johnson, 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)(B); and that Mr. Williams was "not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation," id. § 3267(2)(C), that is, Germany. See Nov. 9, 2010 Trial Tr. at 38-39.
In his oral motion on November 2, 2010, Mr. Williams argued that he was entitled to judgment of acquittal because, as he
The government disagrees, arguing that it presented more than sufficient evidence at trial to meet its burden on the "residing with" element. According to the government, the evidence at trial proved that, at the time of Sergeant Johnson's death, Mr. Williams resided in Germany with his wife, Octavia Williams, who was a member of the United States Armed Forces. See Opp. at 2, 5-6.
In what follows, the Court first addresses Mr. Williams' oral argument on the nationality element. The Court will resolve that argument on its merits, because the Court reserved its decision on Mr. Williams' oral motion and because his papers suggest that the nationality element may still be an issue in dispute. See Mot. at 1 n. 1. The Court then addresses Mr. Williams' argument on the "residing with" element.
The government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams "is not a national of or ordinarily a resident in the Federal Republic of Germany." Nov. 9, 2010 Trial Tr. at 38. In his oral motion for judgment of acquittal, Mr. Williams argued that the government did not do so: as Mr. Williams' counsel stated, "I don't recall any testimony, frankly, about [that element]. I think [the government] put in [Mr. Williams'] security clearance that says he's a U.S. citizen, but that doesn't say that he's not a national of Germany." Nov. 2, 2010 Trial Tr. at 6; see also id. at 10. To the extent that this element is still in dispute, the Court has considered Mr. Williams' argument on its merits and will reject it.
At trial, the government introduced Government Exhibit 120. See Nov. 3, 2010 a.m. Trial Tr. at 8-9. As the government and Mr. Williams stipulated, that exhibit consists of two pages of a questionnaire for United States national security positions, referred to as a Standard Form 86, "completed by the defendant and ... maintained in his United States Air Force personnel file." Id. at 9; see also Gov't Ex. 120a at 1. In that questionnaire, dated October 4, 1996, Mr. Williams states that he was born in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and that he is a United States citizen or national by birth. Gov't Ex. 120 at 1. Furthermore, that questionnaire specifically directed Mr. Williams to indicate whether he was at the time or previously had been a dual citizen. It stated: "If you are (or were) a dual citizen of the United States and another country, provide the name of that country[.]" Id. (emphasis in original). Mr. Williams responded: "NA," id., presumably meaning not applicable. In view of this evidence, which was stipulated to at trial and, according the government the benefit of all legitimate inferences, the Court concludes that a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams "is not a national of or ordinarily a resident in the Federal Republic of Germany." Nov. 9, 2010 Trial Tr. at 38.
The government also was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, "at the time [Mr. Williams] killed Juwan
The relevant evidence in the record on the "residing with" element comes from the testimony of three of the government's witnesses, all of whom were members of the Gangster Disciples in Germany: (1) Nicholas Sims; (2) Florentino Charris; and (3) Themitrios Saroglou. See Mot. at 3-4; Opp. at 4-6. Mr. Williams acknowledges that there is testimony in the record to the effect that he did in fact live with his wife while he was in Germany. See Mot. at 3. The problem for the government, as Mr. Williams sees it, is that none of the government's witnesses provided any time frame for when Mr. Williams lived with his wife. See id. at 3-4. That alone, according to Mr. Williams, is a sufficient basis upon which to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal. But going further, Mr. Williams asserts that there is evidence in the record indicating that, around June 2005, Mr. Williams and his wife were having marital problems, see Oct. 25, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 78, and that he was "moving around staying with people" and "was all over the place" during that time. Oct. 26, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 29; see Mot. at 3. Thus, to the extent that the evidence in the record permits any inference regarding the "residing with" element, Mr. Williams argues that the only appropriate inference in this case is that he was not living with his wife on July 3, 2005.
The government conceded at oral argument on June 1, 2011 that it did not ask any of its witnesses whether Mr. Williams in fact resided with his wife on July 3, 2005. And the government implicitly acknowledges that there was no direct evidence introduced at trial on this issue. See Opp. at 5. According to the government, however,
Id.
Although the parties disagree on what inferences, if any, can be drawn from the evidence introduced at trial, the parties appear to agree on how to define the term "residing with." MEJA itself does not further define it. See Supp. Response at 3-5; Opp. to Supp. Response at 2. MEJA's legislative history emphasizes what is plain from the Act's enacted text: in order to assert jurisdiction under MEJA, "[i]n all cases ... the dependent must reside with the military member[.]" H.R. REP. 106-778(I),
As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, "[t]he term `reside' has a commonly accepted meaning." United States v. Namey, 364 F.3d at 845.
United States v. Namey, 364 F.3d at 845 (alterations in original); see United States v. Spencer, 640 F.3d 513, 523 (2d Cir.2011) ("[R]esidence requires an established abode, ... permanent for a time, and such interpretation does not impact [people] who reside [somewhere] on a short and transient basis.") (quotations omitted) (alterations in original); United States v. Novak, 607 F.3d 968, 974 (4th Cir.2010) ("[W]e conclude that the district court did not err when it defined `resided' as `the act or fact of living in a given place permanently or for an extended period of time[.]'").
Although a person's residence requires some degree of permanence, it is to be distinguished from a person's domicile, which requires more and a certain intent. See, e.g. United States v. Venturella, 391 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir.2004); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir.2001). As defined at common law,
United States v. Venturella, 391 F.3d at 125. Thus, residence is "[t]he act or fact of living in a given place for some time, while domicile is a person's true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere." Id. (quotations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d at 857 ("Residence is physical, whereas domicile is generally a compound of physical presence plus an intention to make a certain definite place one's permanent abode[.]") (quotations omitted). "`An individual consequently may have several residences, but only one domicile.'"
Therefore, in view of the case law discussed above, the question presented by Mr. Williams' motion is whether any reasonable juror could have found that Mr. Williams resided with his wife — that is, was living with his wife for some time — on July 3, 2005. See United States v. Venturella, 391 F.3d at 125; United States v. Namey, 364 F.3d at 845.
The Court begins its examination of the record with a discussion of what the government did not do at trial. The government failed to ask any of its witnesses where Mr. Williams was living on July 3, 2005 — "the simple question that would [have] avoid[ed] the need for judicial consideration of what should be a non-problem" in this case. United States v. Hall, 613 F.3d 249, 253 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quotations omitted). Nor did the government introduce the type of evidence that has been considered indicia of residency; for example, evidence on where Mr. Williams received mail, or where Mr. Williams stored his belongings. See, e.g., United States v. Maduno, 40 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir.1994) ("Additional evidence indicated that the husband, although he slept elsewhere, still used the marital home to receive his personal mail, to store his clothes and books, and to serve as the address on the voter's registration card."). Instead, the government relies on the testimony of Nicholas Sims, Florentino Charris, and Themitrios Saroglou, and concludes that their combined testimony "unequivocally provides that Octavia Williams was the only person with whom the defendant `resided' or with whom he lived during the year 2005[.]" Opp. at 5. The government then contends that a reasonable juror could infer from such testimony that Mr. Williams was residing with his wife on July 3, 2005. Id. at 5-6.
The Court therefore reviews below the relevant testimony from those three witnesses:
1. Nicholas Sims. Mr. Sims testified that Mr. Williams was the "[g]overnor" or "head" of their "set" of the Gangster Disciples gang in Germany, Oct. 25, 2010 a.m. Trial Tr. at 81-82, and Mr. Sims identified himself as Mr. Williams' "right-hand man." Id. at 81; see also Oct. 25, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 3-4. Without any specific time reference, Mr. Sims stated that the Gangster Disciples would have meetings "[a]t least twice a month[.]" Oct. 25, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 3. According to Mr. Sims, gang members were required to attend those meetings, the "majority" of which were held at Mr. Williams' home. Id. at 4. Mr. Sims then identified Government Exhibit 47 as a picture of Mr. Williams' home in Germany, id. at 4-5, and Mr. Sims stated that he went to Mr. Williams' home "on a regular basis." Id. at 4.
Mr. Sims then was asked about Mr. Williams' marital status, and Mr. Sims testified as follows:
Oct. 25, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 5-6.
On cross-examination, Mr. Sims was asked whether Mr. Williams, as of June 2005, was "having problems with his wife.... [m]arital problems?" Oct. 25, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 78. Mr. Sims responded: "Yes." Id. And in later testimony, Mr. Sims provided further description of Mr. Williams' marital problems and living situation:
Oct. 26, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 29.
Finally, Mr. Sims testified that, on July 4, 2005, after learning of Sergeant Johnson's death, Mr. Williams and certain members of the Gangster Disciples, including Mr. Sims, Latisha Ellis, Rodney Howell, and Terrence Norman, had a meeting at a cookout. Oct. 25, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 36. At that meeting, Mr. Williams told Mr. Sims that he "may have to leave" Germany. Id. at 38. And as established later by stipulation, Mr. Williams in fact left Germany for the United States on July 6, 2005:
Gov't Ex. 102a; see also Nov. 3, 2010 a.m. Trial Tr. at 9. Mr. Williams never returned to Germany. See Nov. 4, 2010 Trial Tr. at 28-32; see also Oct. 25, 2010 a.m. Trial Tr. at 57.
2. Florentino Charris. Mr. Charris testified that he was deployed to Iraq on January 8, 2004, and that he was in Iraq for "15 months." Oct. 26, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 51. Mr. Charris was deployed back to Germany in "[a]bout March of 2005," and he became a member of the Gangster Disciples in "[a]bout April or May of 2005." Id. at 105; see also Oct. 27, 2010 a.m. at 22 ("It was around April or May of 2005" that Mr. Charris was initiated into the Gangster Disciples.).
Mr. Charris then testified about Gangster Disciples meetings and Mr. Williams' marital status:
Oct. 26, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 109.
3. Themitrios Saroglou. Mr. Saroglou was initiated into the Gangster Disciples in "the summer of 2004," Oct. 29, 2010 a.m. Trial Tr. at 20, and he identified himself as the gang's "treasurer." Id. at 44. Mr. Saroglou, like Mr. Sims, identified Government Exhibit 47 as a photograph of Mr. Williams' home in Germany, and he stated that he had been to Mr. Williams' home "[a]t least three to five times, easy." Id. at 63. He then was asked, without any specific time reference, "whether or not [Mr. Williams] lives there with anyone?" Id. Mr. Saroglou responded: "Yeah, he lived there with his wife, Octavia." Id.
It is clear upon review of the record that neither Mr. Sims, nor Mr. Charris, nor Mr. Saroglou testified that Mr. Williams was living with his wife specifically on July 3, 2005. So the question remains: what could a reasonable juror infer, if anything, from their testimony?
Mr. Charris' testimony is the most relevant. He testified that he became a member of the Gangster Disciples in "[a]bout April or May of 2005." Oct. 26, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 105. He then testified about Gangster Disciples "meetings." Id. at 109; see id. at 110. Within his testimony about those meetings, Mr. Charris stated (1) that he knew Mr. Williams' wife; (2) without qualification, that Mr. Williams "lived with" his wife; and (3) that Mr. Williams' wife was present at one Gangster Disciples meeting that Mr. Charris attended at Mr. Williams' home. Id. at 109.
Considering that testimony in the light most favorable to the government, the Court concludes that a reasonable juror could find that Mr. Charris became a member of the Gangster Disciples as late as the end of May 2005. A reasonable juror could infer that Mr. Charris would only know about and attend Gangster Disciples meetings after he became a member of that gang. If Mr. Charris became a member of the Gangster Disciples at the end of May 2005, then a reasonable juror could infer that the meetings he mentioned would have taken place sometime in June or early July 2005. And one of those meetings, which Mr. Charris attended, was held at Mr. Williams' home with his wife present. A reasonable juror therefore could infer from Mr. Charris' testimony that it was during the time frame of June to early July 2005 that Mr. Williams "lived with" his wife. Oct. 26, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 109. That inference is further supported by Mr. Sims' and Mr. Saroglou's general testimony that Mr. Williams lived with his wife in his home in Germany, identified as Government Exhibit 47. See Oct. 25, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 4-5; Oct. 29, 2010 a.m. Trial Tr. at 63.
As Mr. Williams points out, Mr. Sims testified that, as of June 2005, Mr. Williams and his wife were having marital problems. Mr. Sims later testified that during the course of Mr. Williams' marital problems, he was "moving around staying with people," and "was all over the place." Oct. 26, 2010 p.m. Trial Tr. at 29. Notwithstanding that testimony, the government argues that "there was absolutely no testimony or any other evidence that the defendant ever `resided' at a location other than with his wife on July 3, 2005." Opp. at 4 n. 2; see also id. at 5 ("[T]he testimony unequivocally provides that Octavia Williams was the only person with whom the defendant `resided' or with whom he lived during the year 2005[.]"). The government
In view of Mr. Sims' testimony, a reasonable juror could have inferred that Mr. Williams was residing with someone other than his wife on July 3, 2005. In view of Mr. Charris' testimony, a reasonable juror also could have inferred that Mr. Williams was residing with his wife on July 3, 2005. And, as noted, under the case law, one may simultaneously have more than one residence. See United States v. Venturella, 391 F.3d at 125; United States v. Namey, 364 F.3d at 845. But, in either case, the question under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is whether a reasonable juror "must necessarily" have had a reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams resided with his wife on July 3, 2005. United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d at 437 (emphasis in original). Under that standard, Mr. Williams' motion must fail. A reasonable juror could have chosen not to credit Mr. Sims' testimony, and a reasonable juror could have inferred from Mr. Charris' testimony that Mr. Williams resided with his wife on July 3, 2005.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Williams' motion for judgment of acquittal on Count One [Dkt. No. 141] will be DENIED. An Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue this same day.
SO ORDERED.
